Is the Conceivability argument sound?

Is the Conceivability argument sound?

But since by hypothesis physicalism is true in their world, their argument is not sound. Therefore the conceivability argument used by actual philosophers is not sound either.

Is Chalmers a Physicalist?

Chalmers argues for an “explanatory gap” from the objective to the subjective, and criticizes physicalist explanations of mental experience, making him a dualist. He has also characterized his view by more traditional formulations such as property dualism.

What is Jackson’s knowledge argument?

The knowledge argument against physicalism centers on the claim that complete physical knowledge does not enable knowledge of consciousness. Jackson argues that Mary knows all the physical facts but not all the facts about color experience, so some facts about color experience are not physical facts.

What is the zombie theory?

A philosophical zombie or p-zombie argument is a thought experiment in philosophy of mind that imagines a hypothetical being that is physically identical to and indistinguishable from a normal person but does not have conscious experience, qualia, or sentience.

Is Jackson a dualist?

Jackson’s argument is meant to support dualism, the view that at least some aspects of the mind are non-physical. Jackson himself went on to reject epiphenomenalism, and dualism altogether. He argues that, because when Mary first sees red, she says “wow”, it must be Mary’s qualia that causes her to say “wow”.

What is the Zombie thought experiment?

What is a modal argument?

Now a modal argument is one in which either a premise or the conclusion is an ordinary or an extraordinary modal judgment. Thus, in modal arguments, we reason about what is necessary, possible, or impossible, or about what might, must, or could not be the case….

Who are the proponents of the philosophical zombie argument?

Proponents of philosophical zombie arguments, such as the philosopher David Chalmers, argue that since a philosophical zombie is by definition physically identical to a conscious person, even its logical possibility would refute physicalism, because it would establish the existence of conscious experience as a further fact.

What is the conceivability argument for the possibility of zombies?

If he is right, then that popular brand of physicalism is mistaken. The so-called ‘conceivability argument’ for the possibility of zombies will provide a focus for discussing some of the main problems raised by the zombie idea. 3. The conceivability argument for the possibility of zombies.

Who is the most systematic use of the zombie idea?

Even physicalists can consistently use this expression, although unlike dualists they take qualia to be physical.) The most systematic use of the zombie idea against physicalism is by David Chalmers (1996), whose contributions to the debate will be considered shortly.

Which is an example of a zombie thought experiment?

The thought experiment sometimes takes the form of imagining a zombie world, indistinguishable from our world, but lacking first person experiences in any of the beings of that world. Philosophical zombie arguments are used in support of mind-body dualism against forms of physicalism such as materialism, behaviorism and functionalism.